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Court in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia,
which was argued on November 4 and
will be decided sometime in 2021. It
is likely that many state agencies and
courts dealing with religious exemption
claims by civil rights defendants may
delay ruling on such claims until the
Supreme Court rules in Fulton.
Judge Murray ended his opinion by
stating, “This is not a final order as it
does not resolve all of the pending
issues in this case.” This cryptic remark
implies that Uprooted Electrolysis may
not immediately appeal the court’s
determination that the ELCRA applies
to the transgender discrimination claim,
since its religious exemption claim
has not yet been ruled upon. However,
the declaration that the MDCR does
not have jurisdiction over the sexual
orientation claim against Rouch World
seems final as to that complaint, so
Attorney General Nessel may be able to
appeal that ruling. ■

22 LGBT Law Notes January 2021

N.Y. Appellate Division 2nd Department
Overrules Precedent, Holding False
Imputation of Homosexuality is not
Defamatory Per Se
By Arthur S. Leonard
In Laguerre v. Maurice, 2020 WL
7636435, 2020 N.Y. App. LEXIS 8011,
2020 NY Slip Op 07887 (2nd Dept., Dec.
23, 2020), a panel of the N.Y. Appellate
Division, 2nd Department, abandoned
a departmental precedent dating from
1984, Matherson v. Marchello, 100
App. Div. 2d 233, finding that today a
false statement that the plaintiff was
a homosexual who watched gay porn
on his employer’s computer is not
defamatory per se and thus a complaint
to that effect must be dismissed for
failure to allege special damages.
The court noted with approval the 3rd
Department’s 2012 decision in Yonaty
v. Mincolla, 97 App. Div. 3d 144, which
was the first intermediate appellate
ruling in New York to abandon prior
case law on this point. Justice Sheri
Roman wrote the opinion for the panel.
Pierre Delor Laguerre was an
elder in the Gethsemane Seventh
Day Adventist Church in Brooklyn.
He claims that he had a falling out
with Pastor Jean Renald Maurice,
the defendant, which, according to
Justice Roman’s summary, “initially
centered around church-related issues,
and that Pastor Maurice stated that, if
the plaintiff ‘did not submit to him,’
Pastor Maurice would ‘crumble’ the
plaintiff.” According to the complaint,
Maurice stated that he would “make
false statements against the plaintiff
and have the church membership
vote to relieve the plaintiff of his
responsibilities at the church.” Laguerre
claims that before a congregational
meeting with about 300 members in
attendance, Maurice made the false
statement concerning Laguerre, thus
prompting the congregation to vote as
Maurice requested. Laguerre sued for
per se defamation.
Pastor Maurice moved to dismiss the
complaint on three grounds.

First, he argued, the court lacked
jurisdiction
because
this
was
essentially an ecclesiastical matter.
Laguerre countered that the question of
defamation could be decided as a matter
of civil law without reference to any
religious doctrine, and the trial judge,
Justice Devin P. Cohen of Kings County
Supreme Court, agreed with Laguerre’s
argument on this point and denied the
motion to dismiss on jurisdictional
grounds, and the Appellate Division
panel found this ruling to be correct.
Second, Maurice argued that his
statement was privileged under the
“common interest” rule, contending
that a communication from a pastor
to a congregation on a church-related
matter could not be made the basis of a
defamation claim. While acknowledging
the existence of the privilege, Justice
Cohen found that Laguerre’s allegations
support the argument that the privilege
was lost in this case because the
statement was made with “malice,”
noting Laguerre’s allegation that Pastor
Maurice had threatened to make a false
statement about Laguerre to persuade
the congregation to terminate his status.
Knowingly making a false statement of
fact with malice is not privileged. The
appellate panel also found this ruling to
be correct.
However, Pastor Maurice was more
successful with his third argument
on appeal, that the alleged statement
was not defamatory per se. Laguerre’s
complaint relies on Matherson v.
Marchello, cited above, to contend that
in the 2nd Department a false imputation
of homosexuality is automatically
actionable as per se defamation. That is,
in ruling on a motion to dismiss, a trial
court in the 2nd Department should
presume that such a statement would
harm the reputation and livelihood of
the plaintiff, so the plaintiff would not

have to allege special damages such as
economic injury in order to maintain
his action. At the time Matherson was
decided, there were rulings by all four
Appellate Departments to similar effect.
However, the 3rd Department broke
ranks in 2012 with Yonaty. The Court of
Appeals has not ruled on the question,
so the matter is left to be decided by
each Appellate Division department.
Given the state of precedent in the 2nd
Department, Justice Cohen had denied
the motion to dismiss on this ground
as well. Laguerre appealed Cohen’s
decision on all three grounds.
Finding the reasoning of Yonaty to
be persuasive, the 2nd Department now
holds that Matherson and the earlier
cases that it had cited “are inconsistent
with current public policy,” wrote Justice
Roman. “This profound and notable
transformation of cultural attitudes
and governmental protective laws
impacts our own consideration of stare
decisis,” she wrote. The court recited
a litany of legal developments since
1984, particularly noting the Supreme
Court’s 2003 decision in Lawrence v.
Texas striking down as unconstitutional
a Texas statute outlawing homosexual
sex and that court’s 2015 decision
in Obergefell v. Hodges finding a
constitutional right for same-sex couples
to marry. The court also noted that New
York has banned sexual orientation
discrimination in employment, housing
and public accommodations since 2002
and enacted its own marriage equality
law in 2011.
Thus, there is today no necessary
presumption that falsely calling
somebody homosexual will harm
their reputation, and such a statement
no longer falls within the sphere of
cases in which reputational harm can
be assumed on ground of criminality,
professional disqualification or the
imputation of a “loathsome illness.” A
false statement that does demonstrably
cause economic harm to the plaintiff
could still be the basis of a defamation
claim, but such harm would have to be
alleged and factually supported in the
complaint. Although the court does
not discuss the point, it seems likely
that being an elder in the church did
not make Laguerre an employee and

so the loss of his position did not inflict
an economic injury on him; otherwise,
he might have alleged that as special
damages.
“Based on the foregoing,” wrote
Justice Roman, “we conclude that the
false imputation of homosexuality
does not constitute defamation
per se. Matherson’s holding to the
contrary should no longer be followed.
Therefore, the plaintiff was required
to allege special damages. He failed to
do so, and, consequently, his cause of
action alleging defamation per se must
be dismissed.”
The unanimous panel of the 2nd
Department in this case included, in
addition to Justice Roman, Justices
Cheryl E. Chambers, Sylvia O. HindsRadix, and Colleen D. Duffy. Laguerre
is represented by Maurice Dean
Williams of The Bronx, and Pastor
Maurice by the firm of Lester Schwab
Katz & Dwyer of Manhattan. ■

Re-Thinking
Correctional
Liability for
Threatened
Violence Against
LGBT Prisoners
By William J. Rold
A Missouri prison gang, calling
itself “Family Values,” extorts payment
from gay prisoners who want to use
the yard. Gang members told pro se
plaintiff Daniel Van Allen that “all gay
prisoners had to pay the gang ‘sooner
or later.’” Van Allen paid the gang
with monthly canteen purchases. He
was never actually beaten, although
he was repeatedly threatened. In Van
Allen v. Lawson, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
235349 (E.D. Mo., Dec. 15, 2020),
U.S. District Judge Sarah E. Pitlyk
dismissed Van Allen’s equal protection
and protection from harm claims as
“frivolous.” She allowed Van Allen
to proceed against the warden and a
unit manager on a First Amendment
retaliation claim – more about that
later – but first, a discussion about the
dismissed claims and a suggestion of
possible new arrows for the victimized
LGBT inmate’s quiver.
Judge Pitlyk dismissed the equal
protection claim because of lack of
“state action,” since the extortion was
from other inmates, in the form of
forced commissary “buys.” It was
not carried out by prison employees,
although Van Allen alleged that the
warden and her deputy knew about
and tolerated the extortion. In fact, Van
Allen alleged that the Family Values
extortion was so widely known that
even the commissioner of DOC was a
proper defendant. Nevertheless, Judge
Pitlyk ruled: “The gang members who
discriminatorily target inmates based
on their sexual preference . . . are not
acting under state law and are not
state actors. They are private parties.
There are no facts alleged suggesting
joint activity between Defendants and
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